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On the Significance of Psychodynamic Discourse for the 
Field of Consciousness Studies
Robin S. Brown
Abstract: Despite the obvious confluence of concerns between psychodynamic 
psychology and the emerging field of consciousness studies, the extent to which 
psychodynamic thinking has factored into the consciousness literature has been 
limited.  With widespread interest in “the unconscious” having significantly 
diminished, the present paper asks what might be implied in the shift towards the 
notion of “consciousness”—what about this cross-disciplinary designation has 
come to attract attention not only within the academic world, but also in the 
popular press?  That the term does indeed invite contributions from a variety of 
disciplines makes the field both a meeting space, and a battleground.  It is posited 
that the field of consciousness studies can be considered both a reaction to, and a 
reflection of, the evolving nature of psychoanalysis in the English-speaking 
world.  After demonstrating the ways in which depth psychological discourse is 
implicated in the debates around consciousness, the author suggests why the 
notion of an unconscious mind might profitably be adopted in the consciousness 
literature.  Stressing the clinical and ethical significance of an assumed capacity 
for creative autonomy in individuals, this paper grounds itself in a fundamental 
concern for the sociopolitical dimensions of the consciousness debates. 
Keywords: consciousness, ethics, psychoanalysis, the unconscious
The widespread shift from psychologi-
cal to biological models of mind has numerous 
ostensible causes, not least of these being the 
manifold pressures exerted on clinical practice 
by the pharmaceutical industry.  Nevertheless, 
it should be admitted that a considerable share 
of the responsibility must fall upon psycho-
analysis itself.  The field’s early concern for 
questions of purity and fidelity to Freud en-
gendered a constant political maneuvering so 
as to delimit that which was properly deemed 
“psychoanalytic.” Had this tendency occurred 
under the banner of some broader and more 
inclusive signifier, the consequences may have 
been less adverse.  Eugen Bleuler is credited 
with having coined “depth 
psychology” [Tiefenpsychologie] with just 
such a view in mind (Ellenberger, 1970, p. 
562).  While this suggested appellation never 
gained widespread currency1, Kohut 
(1977) later adopted Bleuler’s designation in 
attempting to keep his own ideas related to an 
often hostile psychoanalytic mainstream.  
1 Freud (1914) briefly acknowledges the term 
only to state that it is directly equatable with 
“psychoanalysis” (p. 41).
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More recently, the term has come to be 
associated particularly with the Jungian 
community; sometimes to the extent that the 
notion is mistakenly thought synonymous 
with analytical psychology itself.  Despite the 
efforts of those diverging from the Freudian 
orthodoxy, in popular perception 
psychoanalysis remains a far more widely 
recognized designation than depth psychology, 
and for this reason the less inclusive term 
tends to significantly color perception of the 
wider field.  Recent efforts to re-evaluate the 
origins of depth psychology have 
demonstrated the extent to which Freud and 
his followers distorted the field’s early history 
so as to reinforce his position as founding 
father (Shamdasani, 2004; Taylor, 2009).  One 
of the consequences of this tendency has been 
to artificially divorce psychoanalytic thinking 
from the wider history of Western ideas.  
Because psychoanalysis has come to stand in 
for a whole swathe of intellectual activity, 
which it has at the same time disavowed, the 
fate of the field has influenced the history of 
ideas in ways that are complex and not always 
immediately apparent.  It might be said that 
the Freudian legacy has, to a disproportionate 
extent, carried with it the responsibility for 
keeping alive the introspective approach to 
psychology.  Pessimistically, it could even be 
argued that as a consequence of the slipshod 
fashion in which the early profession handled 
its affairs, the most significant influence 
psychoanalysis has had on our perceptions 
about the nature of mind in the present day 
lies merely in the role that the field played in 
hastening the rise of the biological 
reductionism that it was originally established 
largely in distinction to.
Coupled with the shift from a popular 
interest in psychoanalytic thought and the 
tropes of the unconscious to that of neurons 
and chemical imbalances is the emergence of 
a concern for the notion of consciousness per 
se.  Many of the frustrated and sometimes 
contrary hopes attendant to the psychoanalytic 
milieu seem now to be evidenced in the ways 
in which this term has come to be deployed in 
academic discourse.  For some, the notion of 
consciousness reflects nothing less than the 
final field of inquiry waiting to be demystified 
by scientific positivism.  A recent New York 
Times opinion piece by Princeton psychologist 
Michael Graziano typifies this attitude. 
Graziano (2014) confidently claims that there 
are three great scientific questions pertaining 
to the human condition: [1] what is our place 
in the universe? [2] what is our place in life? 
and [3] what is the relationship between mind 
and matter?  He argues that Copernicus and 
Darwin have answered the first and second of 
these questions, while contemporary 
neuroscience is on the verge of answering the 
third by disproving the existence of 
consciousness altogether.  Although this 
supposed dissolving of the idea of 
consciousness is certainly nothing new, 
Graziano’s particular framing of the question 
is telling.  He seeks to establish the notion of 
consciousness as the ground upon which 
Western science is to claim its final victory. 
What is particularly striking about Graziano’s 
way of phrasing things is that the form of his 
argument is an unattributed reworking of a 
claim that suggests something quite 
different—not that science is about to settle 
matters but, quite to the contrary, that 
humanity’s place in the universe has been 
thrown into radical doubt.  While the names of 
Newton and Darwin typically figure in this 
appraisal, just as they do for Graziano, the 
question of consciousness is in fact a 
substitute for the name of Freud.  With this 
amendment the whole matter is given an 
altogether different cast.  Where Copernicus, 
Darwin and Freud are often invoked as a trio 
so as to question our pretension’s of knowing, 
with Graziano’s substitution of the subject of 
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consciousness an inversion occurs by means 
of which the three “big questions” are made to 
seemingly lock-down and confirm the truth 
claims of contemporary science.
It was actually Freud himself who first 
made the connection between his own 
endeavor and that of Copernicus and Darwin. 
This association was ostensibly forged at the 
time so as to explain why psychoanalysis was 
failing to gain widespread scientific approval. 
Freud (1916-17) contends that in recognizing 
the existence of the unconscious:
Human megalomania will have suffered 
its third and most wounding blow from 
the psychological research of the present 
time which seeks to prove that the ego is 
not even master in its own house, but 
must content i tself with scanty 
information of what is going on 
unconsciously in its mind. (p. 285)
While the kernel of this observation may well 
be of fundamental significance, it is 
undoubtedly the case that for Freud and his 
followers the apparent recognition of the ego’s 
having been de-seated was itself sometimes 
made basis for its very reinstatement upon the 
throne of reason—in the field’s early history, 
the initiatory nature of a classical training 
analysis coupled with a technical emphasis on 
the role of interpretation served to promote the 
notion that the elect few had achieved some 
form of special insight not available to the 
general public.  It is obviously ironic that in 
taking aim at the “megalomania” of others, 
Freud is nevertheless quite ready to place his 
own genius alongside that of Copernicus and 
Darwin.  The relationship between self-
humbling insight and a resultant tendency 
towards self-aggrandizing inflation has 
significantly marked the wider discourse of 
depth psychology.  In the field’s early history, 
this tendency can be discerned in the 
distinction between psychoanalysis portrayed 
as an objective science associated with the 
practice of medicine, and psychoanalysis 
positioned as an emancipatory endeavor 
fundamentally concerned with the value of the 
individual (e.g. Fromm, 1955; Lindner, 1953; 
Marcuse, 1966).  The former trend is reflected 
in the extent to which psychoanalytic 
discourse was, for a time, able to influence the 
practice of psychiatry in the English-speaking 
world; while the latter tendency was less 
formal ly ins t i tu t ional ized and more 
fragmentary, often being made subject to 
ostracization from the medically oriented 
mainstream.  The clinical practice of 
psychoanalysis at the present time is still 
struggling to recover from the consequences 
of the field’s inability to contend with the 
tensions implied by this theoretical split.
If, in keeping with Graziano’s (2014) 
position, the consciousness literature reflects, 
in considerable degree, the efforts of 
contemporary science to conquer the mind, it 
has also been informed by tendencies that are 
often quite opposed to this.  In a significant 
editorial from the Journal of Consciousness 
Studies, Goguen et. al. (1997) contrast those 
fields of inquiry often construed by the 
mainstream as “kosher” (philosophy, 
neurobiology, and cognitive science) with a 
much broader range of paradigms commonly 
deemed “taboo.”  This split is very much 
reminiscent of the one discernible in the 
history of depth psychology.  While the 
“kosher” disciplines have about them a sense 
of institutional acceptability reminiscent of the 
particular sensibility pursued by classical 
analysis during its heyday, those fields of 
inquiry deemed “taboo” are reflective of much 
that was disavowed.  The emancipatory/
hermeneutic approach to analysis has come to 
be associated in considerable degree with 
ideas from phenomenology (e.g. Atwood & 
Stolorow, 1993; Csordas, 2012; Nissim-Sabat, 
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2011)—a strand of philosophical discourse 
which has also exerted significant left-field 
influence in the consciousness literature (e.g. 
Chalmers, 1997; Gallagher & Zahavi, 2012; 
Gibson, 1986).  Additionally, a series of 
resonances to the term “consciousness” might 
be considered that relate to critical theory and 
have links with the depth psychological 
tradition both by way of Lacanian thinking, 
and in terms of the relationship between 
interpersonal psychoanalysis and the Frankfurt 
school (Noerr, 2002): the Marxian notion of 
fa lse consciousness (Engels , 1893) , 
Durkheim’s (1893) collective consciousness, 
the more contemporary notion of popular 
consciousness, and the consciousness raising 
of American feminists and Civil Rights 
activists in the 1960s (Sarachild, 1973).  Each 
of these adoptions of the term connect it with 
q u e s t i o n s o f i d e o l o g y a n d p o w e r. 
Furthermore, we might consider the 
underlying influence of several other usages 
that are particularly associated with 
transpersonal approaches to the psyche: the 
notion of higher consciousness which (like 
“the unconscious") has roots in German 
idealism (Ffytche, 2012), and altered states of 
consciousness, a notion popularized by the 
psychologist Charles Tart (1969).
The extent to which the term 
“consciousness” has been associated with both 
political and spiritual emancipation suggests 
that there is much at stake where this notion 
has captured popular attention within the 
frame of neuroscience and the attempt to 
“explain” consciousness.  What might the 
implications be if popular opinion is 
increasingly being shaped by the notion that 
consciousness doesn’t exist?  That such a 
notion might come to gain widespread 
currency seems absurd, and yet in the present 
intellectual climate is eminently conceivable. 
Just as moderns look back bemusedly upon 
the how many angels on the head of a pin 
philosophizing of Medieval scholasticism, it 
may be that in years to come the idea that 
highly intelligent people invested considerable 
energy trying to refute the existence of 
consciousness may seem similarly mystifying. 
For the time being, though, the handling of 
this question has much resting upon it.  The 
extent to which the debates around 
consciousness serve to affirm (or deny) 
biological reductionism, is also the extent to 
which these debates implicitly support (or 
challenge) psychiatry in being able to continue 
basing its assumptions on ideological 
constructs which favor the financial interests 
of the pharmaceutical and insurance 
industries, not to mention the stability of the 
wider infrastructure which depends upon the 
mass adherence to present modes of 
functioning.  Clearly the neurological 
approach to consciousness needn’t imply this 
kind of reductionism.  Popularizers like Sacks 
(1985) and Ramachandran (2011)—both of 
whom have been openly hospitable to 
psychoanalytic thinking—have stressed deep 
respect for the limits of neurology as a 
hermeneutic for lived experience.  While a 
hardline neuroscientific attempt to explain 
consciousness objectively will more than 
likely find no value in psychodynamic 
thinking, in recent years a significant 
movement within the psychoanalytic 
community has developed out of a desire to 
reconcile psychoanalytic theory with brain 
science.  Neuropsychoanalysis seeks to 
establish links between brain physiology and 
psychoanalytic practice, and argues that 
perspectives in terms of both mind and brain 
are equally important in advancing clinical 
practice (Panksepp & Solms, 2012).  This 
movement has attracted considerable support 
form the field of neuroscience.  In the subtitle 
of a recent article, Damasio (2012) is explicit 
in a rguing tha t psychoanalys is and 
neuroscience constitute a “natural alliance.” 
4
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Meanwhile, Nobel laureate neuropsychiatrist 
Eric Kandel (2012) has voiced a belief that 
psychoanalysis “still stands as perhaps the 
most influential and coherent view of mental 
activity that we have” (p. 47).  In light of this 
kind of support, it seems reasonable to argue 
that there is something of a lacuna in the 
consciousness literature with regards to the 
absence of a serious engagement with 
contemporary depth psychology.
From a clinical point of view, the 
manner in which the debates around 
consciousness shape public opinion raises 
important ethical questions. It cannot be 
emphasized sufficiently that these debates 
have tangible consequences for human lives 
(Brown, 2015).  While in recent years 
educated opinion has tended to concern itself 
with the threat of fundamentalism, the rise of 
this tendency in the West might be seen partly 
as an expression of the reductiveness of 
contemporary psychiatry that has arguably 
sewn the seeds, both culturally and clinically, 
for the emergence of just such a climate. 
Perhaps the carefully justified cynicism of 
eliminative materialism (Churchland, 1999) 
perceives in fundamentalist religion both the 
reaction to, and the distorted reflection of this 
movement’s own dogmatic literalism (e.g. 
Blackmore, 2007; Dawkins, 2008; Dennett, 
2007).  In the face of advancing neuroscience, 
for those following in the tradition of Ryle 
(1949) who would refute the existence of 
mind itself, the claim effectively comes to be 
made that the individual has no form of 
privileged access to the nature of their own 
personhood.  A position of this sort clearly has 
deep-seated political implications.  When 
medical science attempts to secure this degree 
of authority for itself, perhaps we might look 
to employ some of the cynicism of the 
eliminative materialists, and ask how it comes 
to pass that mainstream academia has given so 
much credence to this kind of thinking in the 
first place?  Recent publications by Whitaker 
(2010) and Watters (2010) have explored the 
extent to which reductive approaches to mind 
are supported by economic and ideological 
factors influencing the production of 
knowledge.  The working clinician encounters 
the consequences of these pressures on a daily 
basis.  If a significant aspect of the early work 
with patients falls within the scope of psycho-
education, this task becomes all the more 
challenging the more deeply entrenched does 
the culture of biological reductivism become. 
While psycho-education in the context of a 
psychodynamic treatment seeks to empower 
the patient to take their own experiences more 
seriously, objections to the legitimacy of “folk 
psychology” have precisely the opposite 
intention, focusing on claims that the common 
person is not sufficiently educated as to be 
able to experience themselves in a correct 
fashion (Fletcher, 1995).  Where Dennett 
(2001) is explicit in his belief that we are not 
the authors of our own lives, it is unclear in 
what extent he experiences himself on this 
basis.  A great many people seeking therapy 
seemingly do so precisely as a consequence of 
their not being able to attain a sense of self-
agency, yet the present psychiatric paradigm 
appears only to reinforce this.  Clearly any 
form of substantive social change has as a 
prerequisite a basic sense of trust in one’s own 
experience, as opposed to a reliance on the 
assumed authority of others.  Washburn 
(2012) argues that, despite a range of 
criticisms directed towards the psychoanalytic 
conception of the ego, admitting necessary 
revisions the notion itself can still be 
considered fundamentally sound.  Any critique 
of “homunculus" theories of mind that fail to 
engage not on ly wi th the po l i t i ca l 
implications, but also with the vast body of 
clinical literature which would seem to 
correlate the sense of an inner person with the 
capacity to live a more fulfilling life, appears 
5
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to have dangerously overlooked much of 
seeming importance.
In the study of consciousness, one of 
the most pressing arguments in favor of 
retaining psychodynamic models of mind may 
be constituted by way of the ethical questions 
emphasized as a consequence of engagement 
in clinical practice—that is, that the notion of 
an unconscious mind remains deeply 
significant as the basis for a nomenclature 
emphasizing the limits of human reason and, 
by extension, offers the basis for an approach 
to the mind that is pluralistic and demonstrates 
a fundamental respect for uncertainty.  The 
consciousness literature, however, has given 
little consideration to the relevance of 
psychodynamic thought, and where the topic 
has been broached it has usually been only 
with the passing intent of critiquing narrowly 
Freudian conceptions of the unconscious.  In 
this connection, the claim most often 
encountered is that the notion of an 
unconscious mind is demonstrably unsound, 
since for something to function on the level of 
thought it must by definition be potentially 
available to thinking.  The earliest objection of 
this sort appears to have been put forth by 
philosopher-psychologist Franz Brentano, 
who was also the first theorist to posit 
intentionality as the defining feature of all 
mental phenomena.  Writing prior to Freud, 
Brentano (1874/1995) already seeks to contest 
the notion of an unconscious by stating that 
every mental act is by definition in some sense 
conscious.  Having made this claim, however, 
he nevertheless recognizes that mental acts 
can be of different intensities, with mental 
events of a lower intensity coming to be 
experienced as if unconscious.  William James 
(1890) argues similarly that all mentation is 
conscious, but that much of it occurs too 
quickly to make an impression on memory. 
Like Brentano, philosopher of consciousness 
Jean Gebser (1984) also disputes the 
unconscious in favor of an approach 
conceived in terms of conscious intensities. 
More recently, Searle (1994) has again 
suggested that the notion of an unthinkable 
thought is not coherent—by way of what he 
terms the connection principle, he argues that 
unconscious mental states must be potentially 
available to the conscious mind.
The commonplace assumption is that 
thoughts come into being and have 
consequence only in the act of thinking them; 
that the existence of thoughts is dependent on 
our thinking.  But from whence does this 
particular thought arise?  Whatever one makes 
of Jaynes’ (1976) theory of the bicameral 
mind, his work offers ample evidence of the 
ways in which human-beings may have not 
always experienced their thoughts as their 
own.  Clearly the notion of our ideas being 
caused by us and thus reasonably claimed as 
our own private property has a complex and 
multifaceted history.  What we’ve come to 
experience as an unbreakable linkage between 
our thoughts and our thinking doesn’t 
necessarily seem to have been experienced as 
such by people in prior times.  Speaking of an 
encounter in imagination with the biblical 
figure of Elijah, Jung (1989) reports:
He said I treated thoughts as if I 
generated them myself, but, according 
to his views, thoughts were like animals 
in a forest, or people in a room, or birds 
in the air.  He said, “If you should see 
people in a room, you would not say 
that you made those people, or that you 
were responsible for them.”  Only then I 
learned psychological objectivity.  Only 
then could I say to a patient, “Be quiet, 
something is happening.”  There are 
such thing as mice in a house.  You 
cannot say you were wrong when you 
have a thought.  For the understanding 
of the unconscious we must see our 
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thoughts as events, as phenomena. (p. 
95)
This passage is reminiscent of post-
Kleinian analyst Wilfred Bion’s fundamental 
claim that thoughts exist prior to our being 
able to think them.  For Bion, the mental 
apparatus develops out of the need to find 
containment for thoughts that are, at the 
outset, unthinkable.  Grotstein (1988) suggests 
that Bion might reformulate Descartes' cogito 
ergo sum as: “I am, therefore I have thoughts 
without a thinker which demand a mind to 
think about them” (p. 15).  While Jung and 
Bion both call into question whether ideas can 
be considered inherently the possession of our 
minds, the seemingly insoluble dependence 
between thought and thinking has also come 
to be questioned from the opposite angle, by 
way of theoretical engagement with mystical 
and meditative states.  Forman (1997) has 
outlined what he terms Pure Consciousness 
Events, wherein awareness is sustained 
without object.  If thinking can be present 
without a thought, why not thoughts without a 
thinker?
While acknowledging the necessary 
explanatory power attendant to the conception 
of an unconscious, Searle (1994) complains 
t ha t t he no t i on exh ib i t s t oo much 
“unclarity” (p. 151).  In so far as the notion of 
an unconscious mind has been adopted as a 
placeholder for the unspeakable, however, this 
seems only appropriate.  Given this 
acknowledged lack of clarity around the 
subject matter, it is striking that Searle 
nevertheless translates Freud into terms that 
do an obvious disservice to the complexity of 
Freud’s work.  In particular, the notion that 
unconscious states can be understood as—to 
draw from one of Searle’s own analogies—
fish that appear quite the same above water as 
they do in the depths, is a significant 
misrepresentation of psychoanalytic thought. 
Consider, for instance, the following passage 
from Freud (1900) on the waking recall of 
dreams:
There is no doubt, then, that it is our 
normal thinking that is the psychical 
agency which approaches the content of 
dreams with a demand that it must be 
intelligible, which subjects it to a first 
interpretation and which consequently 
produces a complete misunderstanding 
of it. (p. 500)
For Searle (1994), the nature of the 
unconscious can only be defined as “the 
ontology of a neurophysiology capable of 
generating the conscious” (p. 172).  In 
response to this statement, Chessick (2001) 
claims that Freud only speaks of unconscious 
processes as if they were already mental, and 
to read him otherwise is a distortion (p. 671). 
On this basis, Chessick suggests that Freud’s 
position might be a good deal more 
compatible with Searle’s than Searle himself 
realizes.  While there may be some substance 
to this claim, Chessick’s argument might be 
criticized for not adequately recognizing the 
extent to which Freud’s psychology parted 
ways with biology, and it certainly offers no 
defense for the positions of figures like Bion 
and Jung (Brown, 2014).  A more radical 
response might go further, and point out that 
the assumption that consciousness is entirely 
dependent on the activity of the brain is itself 
an unproven assumption.  Rosenbaum (2012) 
has set for th a dis t inct ion between 
consciousness of which we are conscious and 
consciousness of which we are unconscious. 
She justifies the claim that consciousness is 
still present even when we are—according to 
all neurological markers—unconscious, by 
citing studies that indicate how individuals 
under deep anesthesia or in cardiac arrest have 
subsequently been able to recall impressions 
7
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of events taking place in the operating room 
(p. 273).  While recognizing the extent to 
which the phenomenology of the mind is 
clearly linked with the functioning of the 
brain, Grof (1992) observes that the 
assumption that consciousness has its origin in 
the brain is a metaphysical article of faith, and 
not a proven scientific fact.  He offers the 
following analogy:
A good television repair person can look 
at the particular distortion of the picture 
or sound of a television set and tell us 
exactly what is wrong with it and which 
parts must be replaced to make it work 
properly again.  No one would see this 
as proof that the set itself was 
responsible for the programs we see 
when we turn it on. (p. 5)
Contrary to Chessick’s (2001) defense 
of the Freudian unconscious as being 
compatible with Searle’s apparent objection to 
it, Freud ’s (1900) statement that the 
unconscious constitutes the “true psychical 
reality” (p. 613) would appear explicit in 
insisting upon a psychological bedrock as the 
proper basis for approaching psychic life, and 
not one that is to be reduced to the chemistry 
of the brain.  While Freud never seems to have 
lost hope that his theories might eventually be 
corroborated by neuroscience, his approach to 
the mind is an avowedly psychological one. 
By contrast, Searle’s (1994) significant claim 
that consciousness is ontologically subjective 
seems not to have penetrated the substance of 
his own thinking.  In his concern to avoid 
slipping into idealism, Searle in fact states that 
the distinction he draws between intrinsic 
intentionality (that which is attributed to “true” 
mental states) and as-if intentionality (that 
which only gives the impression of being 
intentional without, it is claimed, being so) is 
necessary since “the price of giving it up 
would be that everything would become 
mental” (p. 156).  In keeping with this 
metaphysical commitment, Searle claims that 
attributions to the unconscious are not 
intended to be taken metaphorically; that they 
“lose their explanatory power if we do not take 
them literally” (p. 156).  Not apparently 
considering that what a person experiences as 
“ l i teral” might itself be subjectively 
determined, Searle posits his own assumptions 
as universally applicable and proceeds on the 
basis that “literally” can only mean having 
intrinsic intentionality which, by his line of 
reasoning, comes to mean being objectively 
true on the basis of neurophysiology.  But if 
consciousness is considered ontologically 
subjective, what sense does it make to insist 
that the explanatory power of the unconscious 
rests upon its being regarded as objectively 
valid?  While emergence theory appears to 
offer the promise of providing a scientific 
basis for what Freeman (2003) dubs 
“nonreductive physicalism,” the scientific 
respectability of this notion would seem to rest 
upon ignoring how the emergent property 
[consciousness] of the system subtending it 
[the brain] is the very means by which the 
system subtending it comes to be postulated as 
such in the first place2.  Searle’s (2002) 
vigorous resistance to being labeled a property 
dualist is indicative of an attempt to stave off 
the metaphysical problems that clearly 
threaten when one takes an emergentist 
position on the subject of consciousness.
If we are to follow Freud’s claim that 
the unconscious is the true psychical reality, 
then the extent to which something can be 
thought “literally” true can only be posed as a 
question of faith.  The decisive turning point 
in this respect was Freud’s rejection of the 
theory of infantile seduction in favor of his 
2 For an examination of how this problem ex‐
presses itself in the psychodynamic literature, 
see Brown (2013).
8
CONSCIOUSNESS: Ideas and Research for the Twenty-First Century, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.ciis.edu/conscjournal/vol1/iss1/2
Consciousness: Ideas and Research for the Twenty First Century | Spring 2016 | Vol 1 | Issue 1
Brown, R., On the significance of psychodynamic discourse for the field of consciousness studies
Corresponding author: robin_s_brown@hotmail.com       
Retrieved from http://www.conscjournal.org/?page_id=59 
ISSN applied for www.conscjournal.org   Page 9
later belief that the notion of a “real world” 
event of this sort was in most cases produced 
by a way of an infantile wish fulfillment.  The 
shift thus implied was to place primary 
emphasis on the fantasy of the patient over 
and above any question of what the clinician 
might imagine had “really” happened (Freud, 
1916-17, p. 368).  In recognizing the 
psychological primacy of the patient’s fantasy, 
objections to the Cartesian theatre start to 
seem moot, and might more reasonably be 
considered demonstrative of the limits of 
physicalism than of the need for a more 
radical skepticism.  Dennett’s (1992) claim 
that the self is the center of a narrative fiction 
can be regarded as quite correct, but his 
implicit assumption that a fiction doesn’t have 
its own ontological gravity is the reflection of 
a characterologically determined article of 
faith in the primacy of matter.  Refuting the 
Cartesian theater on the evidence of 
experimental psychology makes little sense 
since, as Chalmers (1995) has argued, the 
phenomenon itself remains.  Likewise, to 
criticize homunculus theories on the basis of 
an infinite regress is only legitimate should the 
notion be put forward in an effort to “explain” 
consciousness, not if it is used to describe (and 
loosely at that) something of the manner in 
which many people introspectively experience 
themselves.  To remain in a literalistic mode 
and insist upon asking who thinks for the 
homunculus, is surely to have missed the 
point.
A p p r o a c h i n g t h e t o p i c o f 
consciousness with integrity, we have to 
contend with the extent to which the field’s 
subject matter is unavoidably implicated in the 
act of attempting to study it.  Jung (1947) 
refers to this struggle as the absence of an 
Archimedean point of reference (p. 216).  In 
the early history of psychology, this 
fundamental problem was referred to as “the 
personal equation.”  The only way that the 
discipline of psychology was ultimately able 
to respond to this challenge while maintaining 
its tenuous credentials as a science, was to act 
as though having obviated the personal factor 
altogether by focusing only on observable 
behavior.  It is unsurprising, therefore, that the 
recent re-emergence of consciousness as an 
acceptable topic of academic study took place 
outside the domain of psychology proper; 
a r i s i n g , p e r h a p s n e c e s s a r i l y, a s a 
transdisciplinary phenomenon.  In so far as the 
metaphysics of Baconian science come to hold 
sway exclusively, then the field is perhaps 
destined to swallow itself.
If the founding act of neuroanatomy 
can be thought constituted in the cleaving of 
right hemisphere from left, then it seems only 
appropriate given the recurring significance 
that the motif of a division into two has been 
observed to exhibit in the world’s creation 
mythology (von Franz, 1972).  It might further 
be noted that in the very act of division 
signifying the field’s creation, the left brain is 
implicitly privileged from the outset. Under 
the influence of this kind of thinking, the 
fledgling field of consciousness studies has 
been considerably preoccupied with the 
question of whether that which the discipline 
purports to examine can even be said to exist 
in the first place. Might this tendency reflect 
an ironic manifestation of what Freud referred 
to as “the return of the repressed”? As the 
notion of the unconscious continues to go 
largely unacknowledged within the field, is 
that which is unconscious in consciousness 
studies fast coming to be the notion of 
consciousness itself?  The present paper has 
sought to show that efforts to redress the 
balance of this conversation might be aided by 
means of a more direct engagement with the 
ethical, clinical, and theoretical dimensions of 
psychodynamic discourse.
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